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The Fallacy of Duffield v. Robertson

and Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch: The

Continuing Viability of Mandatory
Pre-Dispute Title VII Arbitration
Agreements in the Post-Civil Rights
Act of 1991 Era
Kristen Decker*and William Krizner"

I. INTRODUCTION
Two recent decisions, one in the Ninth Circuit and one in a Massachusetts
District Court, have erroneously held that mandatory Title VII pre-dispute arbitration
clauses are unenforceable under the Civil Rights Act of 1991.' A statutory
construction analysis of the 1991 Civil Rights Act demonstrates that Congress did
not intend to abolish the use of such clauses. Instead, Congress intended to support
the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration as a valid and useful forum for the
resolution of disputes arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The purpose of the following Article is twofold. First, this Article will present
a persuasive critique of the arguments presented in the Duffield and Rosenberg
decisions and offer an alternative interpretation of the statutory intent of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. Second, this Article will demonstrate that enforcement of predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment claims is in the best interest of
both the public and the parties involved in employment disputes.

* Special thanks to my parents, Robert and Lucienne Decker, for their unconditional love and support
and to Professor Rob Atkinson for teaching me to be both a fast fish and a loose fish at the same time.
.. Special Thanks to Lawrence McGoldrick of Fisher & Phillips for his insight into this
project. The
author would also like to thank both the Krizner and Lowanse families for their sacrifices though the
years.
1. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens, 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass 1998).
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II. THE HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY EVOLUTION OF
THE ARBITRABILITY OF EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
A. The Pre-1991 Development of Arbitration

Within the Employment Context
Since the enactment of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 federal courts
have played a necessary and vital part in the enforcement of the anti-discrimination
statute. In Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., the Supreme Court explained that
"federal courts were entrusted with the ultimate enforcement responsibility under
Title VII." 3 Emphasizing the central role of the federal judiciary, early decisions,
particularly those in the collective bargaining context, largely held mandatory
arbitration clauses unenforceable.
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, for example, the Supreme Court
found Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act to forbid the use of mandatory arbitration
within the collective bargaining context.4 In Alexander v. Gardener-Denver,the
Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion and further underscored the importance
of the judiciary in resolving employment claims. The Court held that an arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement would not preclude a plaintiff from
pursuing a Title VII claim in federal court. 6 Prior to 1991, Gardener-Denverwas
commonly understood to forbid compulsory arbitration of all claims brought
pursuant to Title VII. 7
B. Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corporation:
ArbitrationRecognized as a Valid Dispute
Resolution Mechanism by the Supreme Court
The course of arbitration of employment discrimination claims took a radical
shift in Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp., a 1991 Supreme Court decision.'
The Court in Gilmer held that a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (ADEA)9 could be "subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to an
arbitration agreement in a securities registration application.' 0 The Court
distinguished the facts of Gilmer from those present in Gardener-Denveron the

2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1964).
3. 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982).
4. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
5. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
6. Id. at 56. The Court's decision in Gardener-Denverwas reaffirmed in Chandler v. Roudebush, 425
U.S. 840 (1976) (applying the Gardener-Denverholding to federal employees), and McDonald v. West
Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
7. See Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184, 185-87 (1st Cir. 1989); Rosenfeld v. Department
of Army, 769 F.2d 237, 239 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr., 719 F.2d 1426, 1431
(9th Cir. 1983).
8. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
9. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1967).
10. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
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grounds that Gardener-Denverinvolved a collective bargaining agreement, whereas
Gilmer involved an arbitration agreement between an individual and an employer."1
The Court in Gilmer explained that, although arbitration may not be an appropriate
forum for all statutory claims, individual agreements to arbitrate should be upheld
absent express Congressional intent to prohibit waiver of remedies for the statutory
rights in question. 2
Courts have since held that Gilmer'sendorsement of compulsory arbitration for
statutory civil rights claims brought pursuant to the ADEA also applies to claims
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.13 In Mago v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton Inc., for example, the Ninth Circuit in compelling arbitration
reasoned that "although Gilmer involved a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 rather than the Title VII claim brought by [the plaintiff],
both statutes are similar in their aims and substantive provisions."' 4 This
interpretation was broadly accepted by the federal judiciary until the Rosenberg and
Duffield courts denied such an extension based on an erroneous analysis of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. "
C. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
Five months after the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, Congress enacted
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The 1991 Act was chiefly designed to ease the burden
of initiating and proving discrimination claims.' 6 It also expanded the procedural
remedies available to plaintiffs bringing discrimination suits and expressly stated that
"[w]here appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve
disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of federal law amended by this title." 7
Despite express Congressional approval, this Act serves as the basis for the
misguided Rosenberg and Duffield decisions.

I1. Id. at 34-35.
12. Id. at 24-26.
13. See Seus v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 146 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1998); Patterson v. Tenet
Healthcare Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997); Auston v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc.,
78 F.3d 875,883 (4th Cir. 1996); Hurst v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 21 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 1994); Metz v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1994); Valdiviezo v. Phelps
Dodge Hidalgo Smelter, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (D.C. Ariz. 1993); Bender v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 700 (1.1th Cir. 1992).
14. Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992).
15. The Fifth Circuit in Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) and the
District of Columbia Circuit, in Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurities Services., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C.
Cir. 1997) have expressly accepted the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
16. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1191.
17. 42 U.S.C.§ 1981 (1994) (historical and statutory notes) (emphasis added).
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III. RECENT CHALLENGES TO THE VALIDITY OF MANDATORY PREDISPUTE EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
An individual seeking work as a broker in the securities industry with any
employer is required to sign the industry's Uniform Application for Securities
Industry Registration or Transfer, commonly known as a "Form U-4." The Form U-4
is a standardized form that requires all prospective securities brokers to "agree to
arbitrate any dispute, claim or controversy that may arise between [the employee]
and [the] firm, or a customer, or any other person."'" As a condition of her
employment as a broker-dealer in the securities industry, therefore, Tonyja Duffield,
the plaintiff in Duffield, signed an agreement to arbitrate all potential claims against
her employer, effectively waiving her right to a judicial forum to resolve any
employment dispute.
In 1995, Duffield filed suit in federal court alleging sexual discrimination and
sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'9 As a threshold
matter, Duffield requested that the court enter a judgment declaring that employees
in the securities industry cannot be bound by the Form U-4 to arbitrate all
employment disputes.20 To support this assertion, Duffield argued, inter alia, (1)
that the U-4 form was not a "voluntary" agreement; (2) that she did not make a
"knowing" agreement to arbitrate by signing the Form U-4 within the meaning of
Title VII; (3) that the NYSE's system of arbitration did not sufficiently protect her
rights under Title VII; and (4) that the Form U-4 is an unconscionable contract of
adhesion. 2
The plaintiff in Rosenberg also signed a Form U-4 as a condition to working
as a securities broker. She also filed suit in federal court for gender and age
discrimination in violation of Title VII and asserted that she could not, as a condition
of employment, be obliged to waive the right to litigate her Title VII claim in a
judicial forum.
The courts in Duffield and Rosenberg, therefore, were both faced with
essentially the same question: can an employer require, as a condition of
employment, that each of its employees waive his or her right to litigate Title VII
and other statutory and non-statutory claims in a judicial forum and agree to arbitrate
all employment disputes? To answer this question, the courts in Duffield and
Rosenberg engaged in statutory construction analyses of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
to ascertain whether Congress evinced an intent to preclude agreements of that
nature in enacting the 1991 Act.22 Both courts considered this question and
concluded that Congress did intend to prohibit the use of compulsory arbitration
agreements to resolve employment claims arising under Title VII. 23
The courts in Duffield and Rosenberg relied chiefly upon an interpretation of
the purpose behind the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and of the Act's

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185.
Id. at1186.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1185; Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 193-94.
Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185; Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 200.
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legislative history in holding that compulsory arbitration agreements are
unenforceable pursuant to the 1991 Act.24 The Duffield and Rosenberg courts found
that the primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was to overrule Supreme
Court cases with which Congress disagreed and to make employment discrimination
25
suits easier for plaintiffs to initiate and prove. Based upon this characterization of
Rosenberg courts concluded that
and
Duffield
the main goals of the Act, the
such as the compulsory
provisions
to
validate
meant
have
not
Congress could
arbitration agreements at issue in these two cases, given that such agreements
involve individuals waiving rights to appear in federal court to resolve statutory
claims.26 The Duffield and Rosenberg courts reasoned that such agreements would
limit plaintiffs' rights rather than broaden them, thereby contravening the purpose
of the Act.27
The Duffield and Rosenberg courts also declared that Congress's position on
arbitration (contained in Section 118 of the Act quoted above) was "ambiguous" and
chose to analyze legislative history. 8 Based on a review of the legislative reports the
courts chose to accept as representative of Congress's "true" intent, the Duffield and
Rosenberg courts concluded that the 1991 Civil Rights Act overruled the Supreme
Court's decision in Gilmer, regardless of the fact that the Act itself never does take
such a stance and only contains positive statements concerning the use of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms.2 9
The Duffield and Rosenberg courts' faulty reasoning has been recently adopted
by several district courts as well. For example, in Winkler v. Pacific Brokerage
Services, Inc., the Northern District of Illinois found that "any agreement by [a]
plaintiff to submit future Title VII claims to arbitration, made either in the
30
employment application or in the arbitration agreement, is unenforceable."
Similarly, a Second Circuit District Court has recently held that plaintiffs could
prove "[C]ongress intended to prohibit prospective agreements to arbitrate Title VII
pre-dispute arbitration still
claims", but also stated that the issue of mandatory
"remains a federal question without a clear answer".3 The remaining portion of this
project intends to set forth the elusive "clear answer" for which the Illinois District
Court and the rest of the federal judiciary continue to search.
IV. GILMER STILL THE LAST WORD: EVIDENCE OF CONGRESSIONAL
APPROVAL OF MANDATORY PRE-DISPUTE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The courts in Duffield and Rosenberg erroneously held that through the
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 Congress invalidated the use of

24. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1190-91; Rosenberg, 995 F.Supp. at 193-94.
25. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1191; Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 200.
26. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193; Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 201.
27. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193; Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 201.
28. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193-99; Rosenberg, 995 F.Supp. at 201-03.
29. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193-99; Rosenberg, 995 F.Supp. at 200-03.
30. Winkler v. Pacific Brokerage Servs., Inc., No. 97-C-7340, 1998 WL 341622 (N.D. II1. June 19,
1998).
31. Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
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compulsory arbitration of Title VII claims, thereby implicitly "overturning" the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer. Careful analysis of the text and purpose of the
statute, however, illustrates that Congress has not taken any explicit or implicit
action to discourage the mandatory arbitration of civil rights claims.
A. Plain Meaning and ContextualAnalysis of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991
"Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver ofjudicial remedies for
the statutory rights at issue." 2 Congress has demonstrated no such intent through its
enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. To the contrary, the plain language found
in Section 118 of the 1991 Act clearly sanctions the arbitration of disputes falling
under the Act.
The first step in a statutory construction analysis is to review the express
language of the provision at issue.33 The Act provides that: "[w]here appropriate and
to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute resolution,
including . . .

'
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes."34

Therefore,

arbitration of statutory claims is "authorized by law," pursuant to Section 118 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. The words "authorized by law" in Section 118, viewed in
their everyday usage, mean to "give power or authority to" the law.35 This phrase
demonstrates a clear signal that Congress is willing to defer to the judiciary for
guidance on the validity of mandatory arbitration agreements. When the 1991 Act
was enacted by Congress, Gilmer was the most recent word by the Supreme Court
on the mandatory arbitration of statutory claims. Gilmer, handed down by the
Supreme Court on May 13, 1991, had been the law on arbitration for five months
when the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed by both houses of Congress on
November 7, 1991,36 and had been in effect for nearly six months when the 1991 Act
was signed into law by President Bush on November 21, 1991.' 7 Hence, the
controlling law at the time the 1991 Act was passed clearly rendered mandatory predispute arbitration agreements involving employment claims legally enforceable
documents.38
The plain meaning of the text contained in Section 118 is better understood
through a contextual examination of the remaining relevant portion of the statute.39

32. Seus, 146 F.3d at 179 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
33. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470,485 (1917); United States v. Riveria, 131 F.3d 222, 223
(1st Cir. 1997).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (historical and statutory notes) (emphasis added).
35. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 139 (1994).
36. See 137 CONG. REC. H9505-01 (1991); see also 137 CONG. REC. S15472-01 (1991).
37. PresidentSigns Omnibus Civil Rights Bill, Backs Away From ControversialInterpretation,226
DAILY LABOR REPORT A-12 (BNA Nov. 22, 1991).
38. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
39. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,515 (1993) (stating that a statute should be read as a whole
because the language of the statute is dependent upon the context in which it is written); King v. St.
Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215 (1991); Castenllano v. City of New York, 142 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1998);
Ford v. Schoring-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601 (3d Cir. 1998); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. Carter &
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Section 118 states that in appropriate situations, arbitration agreements that are
authorized under the law are "encouraged" to resolve disputes arising under the 1991
Act.4 The plain meaning of the term "encourage" is "to give support to."' Thus,
this section of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 can be read to indicate Congress's
willingness to support the use of those authorized arbitration agreements.
The Duffield court sidestepped this contextual interpretation of Section 118 by
stating that it is "disingenuous to fasten onto one word" and to assume that Congress
meant to state its approval of all forms of arbitration.42 However, proponents of the
position that mandatory arbitration agreements are valid under the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 do not posit that Congress sanctions all forms of arbitration. Rather, the
proponents recognize that Congress used the words "authorized by law 4 3 to confer
authority upon the federal judiciary to decide in which situations arbitration is the
proper method of dispute resolution.
The Supreme Court in Gilmer exercised its authority in this regard and clearly
stated that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements are valid and effective
instruments for dispute resolution." The plain meaning of Section 118 of the 1991
Act is that Congress sought to defer to the Gilmer Supreme Court decision on this
issue. Indeed, several circuits have consistently construed the language of Section
118 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act as consistent with the Gilmer decision and
compulsory arbitration.45
The only reference to the arbitration process in the 1991 Act is in Section 118,
excerpted above. If the intent of Congress is obvious, courts are required to give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.46 In its plain language,
the 1991 Act encourages employees and employers to seek alternatives to litigation.
Arbitration, therefore, is not only not precluded (as maintained by the courts in
47
Rosenberg and Duffield), but is actually encouraged.
B. Legislative History of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
and InterpretativeGuidance
Where Congress has plainly stated its intended meaning in the text of a statute
and the statutory text contains an unambiguous phrase, the meaning of the phrase

Tillery Enter., 133 F.3d 1183 (9th Cir. 1998); Chair King, Inc. v. Houston Cellular Corp., 131 F.3d 507
(5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Rivera, 131 F.3d 222 (lst Cir. 1997).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (historical and statutory notes).
41. WEBSTER'S 11NEW RIVERSIDE DICTIONARY 430 (1994).

42. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1193.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (historical and statutory notes).
44. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25.
45. See Seus, 146 F.2d at 182; Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); Hirras
v. Nation R.R. Passenger Corp., 10 F.3d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 114 S. Ct. 2732 (1994) (stating that "[section] 118 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act encourages the
use of arbitration"); see also Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430, 1436 (N.D. I11.
1993); Lockhart v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 65 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 5, 7 (D. Kan. 1994).
46. Norfolk & Western Ry. v. American Train Dispatchers Ass'n, 499 U.S. 117, 128 (1991);
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) (stating that where the plain meaning is "clear on
its face," the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (historical and statutory notes).
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should not be extended or subverted by the statements of individual legislators or
committees made during the enactment process. 48 The text of Section 118 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 is clear. It is not necessary to look beyond the face of the
statute to ascertain that Congress did not evince an intent to prohibit mandatory
arbitration of statutory claims in the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
The Duffield and Rosenberg courts, however, deemed the language of Section
118 "ambiguous" and engaged in a protracted analysis of the 1991 Act's legislative
history in order to glean Congress's intent.49 While the plain language of the 1991
Civil Rights Act clearly expresses Congress's approval of arbitration, an analysis of
the Act's legislative history may be useful to demonstrate the error of the Duffield
and Rosenberg decisions.50
In Rosenberg, the district court cited specifically to House Reports 40(I) and
40(11) to establish that Congress disapproved of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration. 51
According to the court in Rosenberg, because Congress rejected an amendment
which would have statutorily approved of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in these
reports, it could not have been referring to the Gilmer decision when it used the
phrase "authorized by law." 2 What the Rosenberg court failed to recognize in
relying on these reports in its statutory analysis, however, is that the Supreme Court
decided Gilmer on May 13, 1991, three weeks after House Report 40(I) was
published, and only four days before House Report 40(11) was published.5 3 Although
critics, have attempted to bypass this fact calling it a "quirk of chronology," 54 the
timing of these reports is essential in understanding Congress's true intent. Given
that these reports were published months before the passage of the 1991 Act and that
one was even published before the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Gilmer, it is clear that the Rosenberg court incorrectly relied on these
unrepresentative reports for legislative guidance.
Hence, even granting an indulgent review of the legislative history cited by the
Duffield and Rosenberg courts provides no clear evidence that Congress intended to
preclude arbitration in enacting the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Rather, it is more
appropriate to look to the legislative history that was created a reasonable amount
of time after the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer to obtain an accurate picture
of the legislative climate that was present when the 1991 Civil Rights Act was
passed.
In the Duffield case, the plaintiff asserted that "[n]o one in Congress advanced
the.., view.., that the 1991 Act would allow perspective waivers obtained as a
condition of employment."55 This argument, however, ignores the post-Gilmer
legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act which suggests that influential
48. West Virginia Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1991).
49. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1195; Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 201-03 (D. Mass 1998).
50. Rhode Island v. Narragansett Indian Tribe, 19 F.3d 685 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that after
reviewing the plain meaning of a statute, it is sometimes advantageous to engage in further statutory
analysis to determine legislative intent).
51. Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 200 (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-40(1), at 75 (1991), reprintedin 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 613.
52. Id.
53. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20; H.R. REP.No. 102-40(I); H.R. REP.No. 102-40(11) (1991).
54. Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243,258 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
55. Brief for Appellant at 25, Duffield v. Roberston Stephens, 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir 1998).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1998/iss2/2

8

Decker and Krizner: Decker: Fallacy of Duffield v. Robertson and Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch:
149
1998] Fallacyof Duffield v. Robertson and Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch
members of both the House and the Senate were in favor of Gilmer's holding
56
supporting the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements. On the day
that the Civil Rights Act was passed in the Senate, Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole
submitted a section-by-section analysis of the Act into the congressional record
which represented his views, those of the administration, and those of thirteen other
senators.
This analysis included a section entitled "alternative means of dispute
resolution" which indicated that members of Congress viewed arbitration and other
innovative methods of dispute resolution in a favorable light. The section declared:
"In light of the litigation crisis facing this country and the increasing sophistication
and reliability of alternatives to litigation, there is no reason to disfavor the use of
such forums."'
The senatorial analysis then directly cites the Supreme Court's decision in
Gilmer for support of this proposition, demonstrating that many legislators involved
in the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act were not only aware of the Supreme
Court's decision and its approval of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration, they
supported it.5 9 An exact duplicate of this analysis was also entered into the House
of Representatives' congressional record as an interpretive memorandum on the day
that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was passed by the House.60
Further illustrative of Congress's approval of the use of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration, as set forth in Gilmer, is the willingness of President Bush to accept
6
Senator Robert Dole's interpretative guidance on the statute. ' Concurring with
Senator Dole's interpretation, President Bush made the following statement
regarding the pertinent section:
[S]ection 118 of the Act encourages ... alternative mechanisms such as
mediation and arbitration. This provision is among the most valuable in
the Act because of the important contribution that voluntary private
arrangements can make in the effort to conserve the scarce resources of the
Federal judiciary for those matters as to which no alternative forum would
be possible or appropriate.62
President Bush's statement indicating an acceptance of language contained in
the legislative history of Section 118 is of critical importance to the interpretation of
the statute because although legislative history often plays a salient part in the
statutory analysis process, legislative history is a "frail substitute for the ... text of
a law and its presentment to the President."'63 In stating the importance of alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve Title VII claims, President Bush further
underscored the fact that Congress accepted and adopted the law in force at the time

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See 137 CONG. REC. S15472-01 (1991).
Id.
137 CONG. REC. S15472-01 (1991).
See id.
137 CONG. REC. H9505-01 (1991).
See PresidentSigns Omnibus, supra note 37.
Id.
Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188 (1988).
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the 1991 Act was passed, namely that which was created by the Supreme Court in
Gilmer.'
C. Arbitration Is Compatible with the Purpose of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991
The court in Duffield bases its holding in part on what it discerns was the
purpose behind the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. According to the
Duffield court, the 1991 Act had two primary goals:
(1)to "restore . . .civil rights laws" by "overruling" a series of 1989

Supreme Court decisions that Congress thought represented [a] restrictive
reading of Title VII ... and (2) to "strengthen" Title VII by making it

easier to bring and prove lawsuits, and by increasing the available judicial
remedies"
The Duffield court concluded that, in light of the Act's enlargement of rights of
victims of employment discrimination, to read the Act as sanctioning mandatory
arbitration of Title VII claims would be incompatible with the purposes behind the
Act.6 However, the Duffield and Rosenberg courts both ignored the ability of predispute mandatory arbitration agreements to promote these purported Congressional
goals.
As an initial matter, it is notable that courts have consistently held that all of the
remedies available within the federal judiciary are also available in arbitration.67
Therefore, by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not waive any of
the substantive rights afforded by a statute.68 When a party agrees to arbitrate, it
merely "submits to resolution in an arbitral rather than judicial forum., 69
Arbitration may also be more effective than the federal judiciary in
accomplishing the second goal of the 1991 Act, that of lessening the burden on
plaintiffs. Arbitration provides a much less expensive and more expedient avenue

64. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 21.
65. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1191.
66. Id.; see also Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 205.
67. See, e.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995) (giving arbitrators
the power to make punitive damage awards); see also Willoughby Roofing & Supply v. Kajina Int'l, 598
F. Supp. 353,356 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (allowing arbitral award of punitive damages where agreement did
not expressly forbid them); Bavorati v. Josephthal Lyon & Ross Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1023, 1029 (N.D. Ill.

1993) (upholding arbitrator's punitive damage award). For an in depth discussion on this matter, see

Margo Reder, Punitive Damages Are a Necessary Remedy in a Broker-Customer Securities Arbitration
Cases, 29 IND. L. REv. 105 (1995).
68. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628); see also Saari v. Smith, Barney,
Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 881 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the "substantive rights enforced
by arbitration are identical to those enforced in a judicial forum") (emphasis added); Rodriguez de
Ouijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989) (explaining that arbitration
agreements are a specialized type of forum selection clause).
69. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
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7°
of relief than a federal court's resolution of a dispute. In fact, several recent court
decisions have noted both the expediency and efficiency of the arbitral process. In
Furr's Supermarkets, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, for
example, the Tenth Circuit stated that the "primary purpose behind arbitration is to
7
avoid the expense and delay of a court proceeding.", 1 In YusufAhmedAlganim v.
Toys "R" Us, Inc.,72 the Second Circuit explained that the two primary goals of
arbitration are settling disputes efficiently and avoiding long and expensive
litigation. Contrary to the reasoning set forth in Duffield and Rosenberg, therefore,
arbitration of employment discrimination claims may very well reach the goals of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act by allowing plaintiffs a more expedient and less expensive
resolution of employment disputes.
It should further be noted that the Supreme Court in Gilmer rejected the notion
that arbitration's procedural differences render it inferior to judicial proceedings. In
Gilmer, the Supreme Court rejected challenges to the adequacy of the arbitration
process. The Court stated that the "procedures and opportunity of review of the
courtroom" that a plaintiff who submits to arbitration may forego are compensated
73
It finally noted
for by the "simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration.
the
render
not
do
process
that the limitations on discovery in the arbitration
74

to prove his claim.
procedure insufficient to allow a plaintiff opportunity

D. Addition of Jury Trial Right in Civil Rights Act of 1991 Does Not
Indicate Implicit Denial of Mandatory Pre-DisputeArbitration
The Duffield court also reasoned that the fact that the 1991 Civil Rights Act
added the right to a jury trial evinces an intent by Congress to broaden the remedies
available to plaintiffs and to preclude arbitration of statutory claims. This rationale
can be refuted by looking to the remedies provided under the ADEA when Gilmer
was decided by the Supreme Court. Gilmer rejected the idea that mandatory
arbitration is inappropriate because "it deprives claimants of the judicial forum
provided for by the ADEA."75 Even though at the time Gilmer was handed down
jury trials were included among the rights of plaintiffs under the ADEA, the
Supreme Court enforced the mandatory arbitration agreement. The Court in Gilmer

70. See Elger Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev.Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding arbitration
is a private system of justice offering benefits of reduced delay and expenses); Ultracashmore House,
Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (1 th Cir. 1981) (stating arbitration was designed to be speedier and
less costly than litigation); see also FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 8-10

(3d ed. 1973); Dawn Perry, Deterring Egregious Violations of Public Policy: A ProposedAmendment
to the Model Employment Termination Act, 67 WASH. L. REV.915, 923 (1992).
71. No. 97-2002, 97-2020, 1997 WL 699063, at * 4 (10th Cir. Nov. 10, 1997); see also ARW
Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455, 1459 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that arbitration saves time
and expense).
72. 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997).
73. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
74. See id.; see also Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Sec., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1475, 1478 n.5 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) (explaining that Gilmer held that the limited discovery process does not render arbitration
an ineffective or unfair process).
75. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29.
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held that the waiver of the right to present one's case before an Article III court and
representative jury does not render an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.76
The Supreme Court has also upheld agreements to arbitrate in other instances
where plaintiffs had a statutory right to a jury trial. In Rodriguez de Ouijas, for
example, the Supreme Court enforced an arbitration agreement in a claim that arose
under §12(2) of the Securities Act of 1993, a statute which provides a jury trial right
to plaintiffs. 7
Thus, Congress's decision to include a right to a jury trial in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 is not probative with respect to the question of whether Congress
approved of the arbitration of claims under the Act's purview. As Courts have
noted: "Establishing a right to a jury trial for Title VII claims does not evince a
congressional intent to preclude arbitration; it merely defines those procedures which
are available to plaintiffs who pursue the federal option, as opposed to arbitration.
78
Title VII claims are clearly subject to arbitration.
E. FurtherEvidence of CongressionalIntent in the
Civil Rights Act of 1991
To illustrate further that Congress did not intend to overturn Gilmer in enacting
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, it should be noted that within the Act itself Congress
expressly overturned several other cases which it deemed inconsistent with the
purposes behind the Act. Hence, where the Civil Rights Act was intended to
overrule employment discrimination cases, it unambiguously makes specific
references to the cases Congress sought to overrule.
For example, Congress expressly used the Civil Rights Act to overturn the
Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 79 regarding
employers' defenses to disparate impact claims brought by employees under Title
VIVO In addition to Wards Cove, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned at least
five other Supreme Court decisions. 8 In contrast, the text of the 1991 Act failed to
overturn Gilmer and the legislative history of the Act contains a favorable cite to the
decision.82
V. THE PROCEDURAL ADEQUACY OF ARBITRAL PROCESS
Despite the fact that arbitration offers an efficient and expedient alternative to
the federal judiciary, critics of arbitration posit that the gains achieved through
arbitration are outweighed by the losses in procedural formalities and the ability to

76. Id.
77. Rodriguez de Ouijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 485 (1989).
78. Ngheim v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); accord Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29.
79. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
80. See H.R. REP.NO. 102-40(1), at 23-30; H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 7.
81. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 4 90 U.S. 228 (1989); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S.
164 (1989) Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989);
Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986).
82. See 137 CONG. REC. H9505-01; 137 CONG. REC. S15472-01.
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83
Relying on generalizations and
conduct broad discovery of information.
mischaracterizations, many critics of the arbitration process allege that arbitrators are
not required to follow case precedent or statutory law and that a smaller percentage
of plaintiffs prevail in arbitration than in the federal court system.' In fact, however,
arbitration provides employment discrimination claimants with a more simple and
expedient process in which to seek vindication of their statutory rights and holds
systematic advantages for both sides of the dispute.
Another common criticism of the arbitration process is that the informality of
the process results in insufficient opportunity to conduct pre-hearing discovery and
inadequate adherence to the rules of evidence. 5 However, what critics of arbitration
fail to recognize is that it is this very informality and simplicity that works in the
favor of claimants and increases the possibility that an individual will have an
opportunity to be heard before a neutral decision-maker on an employment claim.
Because the arbitration process is so much less formal and rigid, it provides a far less
expensive and much more expedient remedy than a claimant can obtain through
bringing suit in federal court.8 6
In the post-Gilmerand post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 era, federal courts have
continued to sanction the arbitration process as a tool for resolving claims of
87
employment discrimination. In Cole v. Burns InternationalSecurities Services, for
example, the D.C. Circuit considered a number of the standard objections to the
arbitration process and dismissed the challenges, recognizing arbitration as a valid
and efficient means of dispute resolution. In Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham
& Co., the Ninth Circuit cited Gilmer as support for rejecting the claim that
deficiencies in the arbitration process were sufficient to avoid arbitration of the
89
employment dispute. 88 In Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., the Sixth Circuit
refused to accept that the arbitration process was not a fair forum for resolution of
a sexual discrimination claim. 90

83. See, e.g., Jean Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court's
Preferencefor Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
84. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Creatingand ChallengingCompulsory Arbitration Agreements, 13
LAB. LAW. 511 (1998).
85. See also Stemlight, supra note 83; see generally,Jean Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality
of the Supreme Court's Preference For Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial,
Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. I (1997).
86. See FurT's Supermarkets, Inc. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, No. 97-2002, 972020, 1997 WL 699063, at *4 (10th Cir. Nov. 10, 1997).
87. 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
88. 968 F.2d 877, 882 (9th Cir. 1992).
89. Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 310 (6th Cir. 1991).
90. Id.; see also Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 803 (Minn. 1995) (dismissing
plaintiffs claim that arbitration process suffered from procedural deficiencies).
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VI. POLICY ARGUMENTS OPPOSING THE DUFFIELD AND ROSENBERG
READING OF THE 1991 CIVIL RIGHTS AcT.

A. The CriticalState of the American Litigation System
The litigation system that is used to resolve employment discrimination
disputes is currently in a state of chaos and crisis. In both the private and the public
sectors, more claims are filed each year than either system can manage efficiently
or effectively.9 The number of employment discrimination cases filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") continues to rise.92
Between the fiscal years 1991 and 1994, the number of discrimination suits filed
with the EEOC increased by forty-three percent. 93 According to data released by the
EEOC, the federal agency needed 305 days on average to close an employment
discrimination claim in 1995. 4 The average processing and closing time for cases
that involved hearings and later appeals was 801 days. 95
The surging number of cases filed each year in the federal court system
threatens to overwhelm the federal docket with an unmanageable caseload. The
number of employment discrimination cases filed in federal court has risen twenty
percent each year over the past four years.' In 1996, American employees brought
23,000 lawsuits alleging discrimination on the basis of sex, age, race, or disabilitymore than double the number brought in 1992, 10,711.9' The judiciary has begun
to look outside its borders for a solution to this ever-growing dilemma, and many
within the judicial community have recognized and heralded the need to divert a
large portion of the caseload to some alternative means of dispute resolution.98
Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements provide the judiciary with just such
a dispute resolving alternative. By ensuring that parties resolve their disputes within
the arbitration process instead of the court system, mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements provide a reliable and equitable arena to wronged employees while
offering an outlet of relief for the desperately overcrowded federal judiciary.

91. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS'
EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE, GAO/GGD 97-157 (F.D.C.H. 1997).
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Kristen Downey Grimsley, Worker Bias Cases Are Rising Steadily; New Laws Boost Hopesfor

Monetary Awards, WASH. POST, May 12, 1997, at Al.
97. Id.
98. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL

COURTS 134 (1995).
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B. Mandatory Pre-DisputeArbitrationAgreements
Within TraditionalContractLaw
1. Mandatory Pre-DisputeArbitration
Agreements Are Supported By the
Basic Principlesof Contract Law
Traditional contract law requires two minimum conditions to create a valid and
binding contract.99 First, both parties must consent to be bound by the terms and
conditions of the contract in question.' t ' Second, the agreement must be definite
enough to be enforceable.0 1 Well-written mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements fulfill both of these common law requirements, and, therefore should be
considered enforceable contracts within the eyes of the law. The first traditional
contract requirement, assent, is often analyzed by evaluating three separate, but
related, components: offer, consideration, and acceptance.'0 2 An offer is where one
party, the offeror, manifests his or her assent to enter into a bargain with another
party, the offeree, conditional on a manifestation of assent in the form of some action
by the offeree.' 3 In the case of most mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements,
the employer generally advertises an employment position, interviews potential
candidates, and then extends an offer of employment to the most qualified
individual. The verbal or written invitation to work with the organization is the
offer.
4
The second component within the assent requirement is consideration.'
Consideration is broadly defined as the common act of trading one thing for
another.0 5 In other words, it is the substance of the contract. Employees are looking
for the best bargain, or consideration, during their search for employment. They are
interested in such things as monetary compensation, geographic location, vacation
time, insurance, and personal investment plans. In exchange for these benefits,
employers demand competence, time, and energy to benefit their operations. Before

99. Neff v. World Pub. Co., 349 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1965); Joseph v. Donover Co., 261 F.2d 812 (9th
Cir. 1958); see also supra text accompanying notes 95, 96.
100. Utley v. Donaldson, 94 U.S. 29 (1876); Vessell v. DPS Assocs. of Charleston, Inc., 148 F.3d 407
(4th Cir. 1998); Williams v. Metzler, 132 F.3d 937 (3d Cir. 1997); Big Yank Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Fire
Ins. Co., 125 F.3d 308 (6th Cir. 1997); Mizuna, Ltd. v. Crossland Fed. Say. Bank, 90 F.3d 650 (2d Cir.
1996).
101. Heydt v. United States, 38 Fed. CI. 286 (1997); Smith v. Fisher Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413
(1st Cir. 1996); Henderson v. Merck & Co., Inc., 998 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
102. Larimer v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 137 F.3d 497 (7th Cir. 1998); Atkins v. GE Capital Mortgage
Sers., Inc. 993 F. Supp. 1406 (M.D. Ala. 1998); Van Heerdon v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 468
(D. Colo. 1996); Toth v. Square D Co., 712 F. Supp. 1231 (D.S.C. 1989); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 22 (1979).
103. Newman v. Schiff, 778 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1985); Lucas v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 298 (1992);
Heydt v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 286 (1997); see also Fosson v. Palace (Waterland) Ltd., 78 F.3d
1448, 1452 (9th Cir. 1996) (offer is manifestation of willingness to enter into a bargain so that other
person understands the offer as understanding of offeror's assent to bargain).
104. Gibson v. Neighborhood Health Clinics, Inc., 121 F.3d 1126 (7th Cir. 1997); NSK Ltd. v. United
States, 115 F.3d 965 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also McCallum v. Lone Star Gas Co., 66 F.3d 98, 101 (1995)
(consideration is present exchange bargained for in return for promise).
105. Id.
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accepting the employer's offer of employment, the third component of assent,'06 the
employee not only looks at the potential benefits of the position, but also presumably
looks to what demands the employer is making and determines the viability of the
proposed contractual relationship.
The mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement often contained within the
master employment contract is one part of the consideration that the employer
demands before entering into an employment relationship. A prospective employee
is allowed to choose whether to accept the offer and receive the numerous benefits
associated with the position in exchange for conceding to the demand for arbitration.
The employee is also free to reject the offer and either make a counteroffer to the
employer demanding the same contract without the mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clause or simply refuse the offer and seek employment with another
organization that does not require such consideration.
Even where a contract has fulfilled the necessary assent requirements, it must
also be definite in nature." 7 The terms within a contract must "provide a basis for
determining the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate remedy."'0 8
Otherwise, the contract is indefinite and therefore unenforceable.' °9 For example,
if a party promises to pay another party a "fair share" of the profits from a specified
endeavor, the contract may be deemed indefinite and unenforceable."o Opponents
of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements may attempt to argue that such
agreements should be deemed indefinite contracts because employees are only
preliminarily "agreeing to agree" to arbitration after employment disputes arise.
However, preliminary agreements are narrowly construed within contract law; they
normally contain either open terms." or merely express the parties interest in
negotiation."' A well-drafted mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement rarely
contains uncertain terms, and clearly states that the employee is waiving his or her
right to court in exchange for the ability to resolve all conflicts within the arbitration
arena. Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements do not fit within the common
law's restricted definition of indefiniteness, and therefore such agreements clearly
also meet the second requirement of an enforceable contract.

106. Gladden v. Pargas, Inc. of Waldorf, Md., 575 F.2d 1091 (4th 1981).
107. Heydt v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 286 (1997); Smith v. Fisher Morse & Co., Inc., 76 F.3d 413
(1st Cir. 1996); Henderson v. Merck & Co., Inc., 998 F. Supp. 532 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
108. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2).
109. Id.
110. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 160 (3d ed. 1990).
1ll. See, e.g., Adjustrite Sys. Inc. v. Gab Bus. Servs., Inc., 145 F.3d 543, 547 (2d Cir. 1998)
(agreement to agree is created where parties agree on certain major terms but leave other terms open for

future negotiation).
112. See, e.g., Rennich v. O.P.T.I.O.N. Case, Inc. 77 F.3d 309, 312 (9th Cir. 1996) (letter of intent

refers to writing documenting preliminary understandings of parties who intend to enter into future
contract).
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2. MandatoryPre-DisputeArbitration
Agreements Withstand Potential
ContractDefense Challenges
After determining that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements fulfill both
the assent and definiteness common law requirements of a proper contract, it
becomes important to consider potential contract defenses. There are four major
duress, incapacity,
defenses used to oppose enforcement of a contract:
3
Although many opponents of
fraud/misrepresentation, and unconscionability.'
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration may argue that these defenses defeat such
agreements, a careful analysis of each of these defenses indicates a complete absence
of common law support for such claims.
a. Duress and Incapacity
The first two potential defenses, duress and incapacity, are not viable in most
challenges to arbitration agreements. Duress requires that the acceptance of an offer
14
was extorted by violence or threat of violence." The incapacity defense requires
proof that one of the contracting parties is either an infant, under the influence of an
illegal substance, or mentally ill." 5 Therefore, aside from these rare occurrences,
these traditional contract defenses offer little support to opponents of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements.
b. Misrepresentation/Fraud
Misrepresentation/fraud nullifies contracts formed where one party either
fraudulently represents the terms, conditions, and consideration of the contract to the
6
other party or withholds material information in bad faith." Proponents of the
Rosenberg and Duffield decisions may argue that employees should be able to
successfully employ this defense to challenge mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements. Such an argument would be based upon the employee's lack of
sophistication and the employer's failure to openly disclose the practical implications
of such arbitration agreements. However, such an argument misconstrues the
meaning of the misrepresentation/fraud defense. Employers are neither providing
misinformation to prospective employees, nor are they withholding information from
employees in bad faith. The misrepresentation/fraud defense does not place any
proactive responsibility on the employer. Rather, they are only obligated to set forth
this requirement of dispute resolution within the body of the written employment

113. See infra text accompanying notes 128-42.
114. Williamson v. Bendix Corp., 289 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 1961); Brown v. United States, 30 Fed. C1.
227 (1993); see also United Intern. Investigative Servs. v. United States, 33 Fed. Cl. 363, 366 (1995) (to
prove duress must show one side involuntary accepted term of other, circumstances permitted no
alternatives, and circumstances were result of coercive acts of opposite party but economic pressure is
not duress).
115. Cundick v. Broadbent, 383 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1967).
116. Bradley v. Chiron Corp., 136 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998); United States v. McBride, 571 F. Supp.
596 (S.D. Tex.1983).
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contract in the same manner as any other consideration within the agreement. Again,
the employee is provided with a sufficient opportunity to review the offer of
employment expressed in the contract before deciding whether to accept the offer.
Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements do not fall within the scope of the
misrepresentation/fraud defense.
c. UnconscionableContracts ofAdhesion
The argument that employees simply cannot understand what they are signing
when entering into employment agreements is better founded within the fourth and
final potential contract defense - unconsciability in adhesion contracts."' This
expansive doctrine has affected many aspects of traditional contract law"' and,
perhaps provides the most convincing argument against the use of mandatory predispute arbitration agreements.
The theory that mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements are adhesion
contracts, and, therefore, are per se unconscionable is founded in a belief that
employees have no choice in accepting employment with a prospective employer.
In reality, however, "adhesion" contracts are merely offers which an employee has
the freedom to either accept or reject." 9 These contracts are quite common and are
seen in everyday agreements such as mortgage and bank loan documents,
automotive and real property rental agreements, and any other standard agreements
in which the terms are preprinted in the sales contract. Hence, individuals freely
chose to enter into a wide variety of "adhesion" contracts every day. The mere fact
that mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate contain non-negotiable terms and
are conditions of employment, does not necessarily mean they are unenforceable,
unconscionable contracts of adhesion. Using this rationale, courts have found that
where an arbitration policy was a compulsory condition of employment, the
agreement is not automatically an unconscionable adhesion contract. 120
Further, the recent court decisions finding mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements unenforceable encourage prospective employees to behave irresponsibly
and ignore express contract promises. Individuals, in and out of the employment
context, need to be encouraged to both read and understand the legal contractual
relationships into which they enter.
Opponents of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements argue that
prospective employees are incapable of understanding the complex language and
substance of such agreements.' 2' The employees contesting mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements, however, are usually highly sophisticated parties with

117. See Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that a contract of adhesion is contract
founded as product of gross inequality of power between parties); Doctor's Ass'n, Inc. v. Jabush, 89 F.3d
109, 114 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that an unconscionable bargain is one which no man in his senses and
not under delusion would make on the one hand and no honest and fair man would accept on the other).
118. See generally GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
119. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 3,5-6 (2d ed. 1970).
120. See Kelly v. UHC Mgmt. Co., 967 F. Supp. 1240, 1257 n.17 (N.D. Ala. 1997).
121. See Sternlight, supra note 83, at 673; see also Stemlight, supra note 85, at 26.
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22
extensive educational backgrounds.' Considering most employers' unwillingness
2
to form express employment contracts with non-professional employees, '
employees with little formal education will not be subjected to the potential
complexities of a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement. Additionally, even
if employers were to utilize mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements with nonprofessional employees, these unsophisticated employees would be able to use the
strength of union organization to gain the requisite knowledge and ability to bargain
with their employers.
The courts have also held that even where employees have the necessary
abilities to completely comprehend and understand mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, they still may not be able to freely bargain with the employer or seek
equivalent employment with another employer within the respective industry. For
example, as in Rosenberg and Duffield, the entire securities industry required that the
employees agree to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements prior to working
as securities dealers. 24 Opponents of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements
therefore,
argue that individuals interested in working as securities dealers are,
25
forced into waiving their rights to gain employment within the industry.' If enough
prospective employees value their ability to bring their future employment actions
in federal court, however, the free market economy will intervene. A rogue dealer
acting rationally will begin to offer an employment contract that does not require a
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement to attract quality employees away from
the dealer's competitors. This natural market response will only occur, however, if
prospective employees value a contract without such a provision. If employees
value salary, investment plans, and other employment benefits over mandatory predispute arbitration agreements, the law should not penalize employers for including
such arbitration agreements within the employment contract. Mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements are not unconsciable adhesion contracts, but rather are only
part of the employer's requested consideration within the contract between the
employer and the employee.
Even assuming arguendo that mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate
do meet the traditional definition of contracts of "adhesion," employees still enjoy
significant protection from courts in that there are judicial limitations on the
26
The enforceability of a contract of
enforceability of these types of contracts.'
adhesion hinges on a determination of whether the clause in question is within the
27
reasonable expectations of the parties.' Thus, courts do take equity concerns into
consideration in making determinations as to the enforceability of these contracts

122. In Rosenberg and Duffield, the plaintiffs were broker-dealers in the securities industry, therefore
each was college educated. See Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 193.
123. Employers would presumably prefer to maintain an at-will employment relationship with their
employees to avoid potential breach of contract claims.
124. Duffield, 144 F.3d at 1185; Rosenberg, 995 F. Supp. at 192.
125. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal. 1981).
126. See, e.g., Seus, 146 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 1998) (under Pennsylvania law, contract of adhesion is
invalid where terms unrealistically favor other party); see also Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164 (2d Cir.
1997) (contract of adhesion is invalid where one party seeking to rescind contract establishes that other
party used high pressure tactics, deceptive language, or contract is unconscionable).
127. Graham,623 P.2d at 172.
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and do examine the extent to which a party was aware of what he was signing. 28
Further, courts also consider whether the terms of the agreement are
"unconscionable."' 29 An agreement is deemed unconscionable where
it contains
terms that unreasonably favor the non-adhering party, and which demonstrates a lack
30
of meaningful choice on the part of the adhering party.
When parties to an employment contract come to a mutual decision to arbitrate
any disputes that may arise between them, such an agreement does not necessarily
benefit either one party over the other. The Eleventh Circuit recognized this fact in
Coleman v. PrudentialBache Securities,Inc., when it noted that "there is nothing
inherently unfair or oppressive about arbitration clauses.''
Opponents of
mandatory pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate contend that the mere fact that the
parties to an employment contract do not have equal bargaining power renders such
an agreement unconscionable. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument
in Gilmer,holding that unequal bargaining power, in and of itself, is not enough to
permit a claimant to invalidate an agreement to arbitrate employment disputes.132
Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements meet the requirements of
traditional contract law. Further, an analysis of the four potential common law
contract defenses provides little support for the opposition to such agreements. The
basic principles of contract law supports the use of mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
agreements within employment contracts.
C. Mandatory Pre-DisputeArbitrationAgreements
And Economic Efficiency
Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements are also supported by the
doctrine of economic efficiency. To understand why such agreements are efficient,
it is helpful to consider three ways to resolve the perplexing questions of
employment arbitration.
1. The No-Arbitration Model ofArbitration
In the first option, the No-Arbitration Model, courts would find employment
arbitration agreements unenforceable in every case. This alternative would allow
either party to breach the agreement and to seek relief of the employment dispute in
federal court. In practice, the statutorily enacted Federal Arbitration Act prevents
such a model. ' Even if this model were to be found legally permissible, however,
it would act to further aggravate an already overcrowded American court system. 3 4
With this increased number of employment claims placed back into the judicial
system, the judiciary would be forced to increase the use of summary judgment, and

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id.
Id. at 173.
Id.
802 F.2d 1350, 1352 (1lthCir. 1986).
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33.

133. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).
134. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

supra note 91.
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therefore deprive otherwise actionable claimants of the opportunity to litigate their
cases. Opponents of arbitration would likely disfavor the use of such a model, as it
would lessen an employee's ability to recover.
In addition to these equitable concerns, the No-Arbitration Model would also
place unnecessary economic restraints on an economy which depends heavily on a
court system to enforce property rights.' 35 If such market enforcement mechanisms
are not readily available, economic actors will be deterred from conducting business
within the market. This model would have fewer immediate effects on ultimate
societal economic efficiency. For example, when it is more difficult for employees
to recover, overall employee morale is likely to decrease, resulting in a decrease in
production and, over time, a less efficient overall market.136
The other potential response to the No-Arbitration Model is for the government
to appoint additional judicial positions to counter the additional claims, creating
expensive administrative costs which would be incurred by American taxpayers. It
is economically inefficient for the government to expend exorbitant fimancial
resources to hire, train, and house additional judges. This argument is even more
compelling when one notes that the private sector is willing to internalize the costs
of their disputes in the form of arbitration.
2. The Post-DisputeEmployee Choice Model ofArbitration
The Post-Dispute Employee Choice Model provides a second potential solution
to the arbitration dilemma. Under this model, courts would implicitly find a choice
provision within every arbitration clause of an employment contract. Employees
would be permitted to consult with an attorney and then decide whether they would
rather pursue their employment claim within the arbitration arena or instead opt to
file a claim in the federal court system. The Post-Dispute Employee Choice Model
is the very solution that the Rosenberg and Duffield courts seem to suggest. 37 In
theory, the solution proposed by this model is an appealing compromise for
employees and employer alike - employers will continue to be able to utilize existing
arbitration processes, and employees are able to freely choose the arena in which to
argue their rights.
Although the Post-Dispute Employee Choice Model initially appears to be 3a
reasonable option, it runs counter to basic principles of the free market economy. 1
Under this model, employees are free to choose the arena in where their disputes will
be heard. In order to minimize their own costs, rational employees will always opt

135. See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN
WORLD (1973); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS,

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC

PERFORMANCE (1990).

136. Martin Oppenheimer& Cameron Oppenheimer, Con: A Management Perspective: Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements Are An Effective Alternative To Employment Litigation, 52 DISP. RESOL. J. 19
(1997).
137. See Duffield v. Roberson Stephans, 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass 1998).

138. For a general discussion of economic efficiency in the context of contract law, see ROBERT
COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 10, 167-202 (2d ed. 1997); ROBIN MALLOY, LAW AND
ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 20,33, 104-12 (1990); THOMAS
MICELI, ECONOMICS OF THE LAW 4,93-114 (1997).
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for the venue which provides the more favorable remedy.' 39 Employees who have
a less significant claim will opt for arbitration where the chance for recovery is much
higher despite a much lower average damage award. For example, an employee who
experienced isolated vulgar comments by her coworkers would probably have her
case dismissed on summary judgment, but would be guaranteed a hearing under the
arbitration clause in the employment agreement. In contrast, an employee with a
more actionable claim, such as a well-documented quid pro quo discrimination,
would likely choose to ignore the arbitration agreement and pursue a civil action, as
this approach allows the plaintiff to seek greater damages and present her claim in
front of a jury.
A rational employer will never allow this employee-choice model to be
implemented. Under the doctrine of economic efficiency, an employer will act to
minimize potential losses by choosing to have all pending employment claims
decided by the federal court system. 140Employers will act this way for two reasons.
First, by eliminating the use of arbitration the employer will be able to avoid the
unnecessary administrative costs of implementing an arbitration program that will
only be used in half of the pending cases. Otherwise, the employer is forced to
maintain a costly arbitration system in addition to paying for legal representation in
the claims brought in federal court. Second, the employer would act to gain the
advantage of the more stringent summary judgment standard available within federal
court and avoid damage awards that employees could recover in a private arbitration
system. The result of this rational behavior by private employers is societal
1 41
inefficiency in the form of an overcrowded court system.
The Post-Dispute Employee Choice Model also creates problems for the
employee, who faces a stricter summary judgment standard. The employer and the
American public, which must absorb the additional administrative expense of the
abandoned arbitration system and courts that are even more overcrowded, are also
losers.
3. The Mandatory Pre-DisputeModel of
Arbitration is the Most Efficient Choice
After reviewing the three potential arbitration models, it is evident that the
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration model presents the most economically efficient
option. Further, implementation of the post-dispute employee choice model
suggested in the Rosenberg and Duffield decisions would act to destroy the
numerous benefits offered by the a private arbitration system. 14 Under the
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration model, employees are still provided with an
opportunity to argue their claims, and the litigation system, which is in desperate
need of alternative forums for resolving disputes, is given relief.
139. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 138, at 167-202; MALLOY, supra note 138, at 33, 104-12;
MICELI, supra note 138, at 93-114.
140. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 138, at 167-202; MALLOY, supra note 138, at 33, 104-12;
MICELI, supra note 138, at 93-114.
141. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 91.
142. See Duffield v. Robertson Stephens, 144 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 1998); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch,
995 F. Supp. 190 (D. Mass 1998).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was not intended to prohibit individuals from
entering into mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The Act does not
contain any conclusive evidence, either on its face or within the legislative history
of the Act, that Congress intended to prohibit individuals from entering into such
agreements. In finding that Congress evinced an intent to preclude the use of these
arbitration agreements, the courts in Duffield and Rosenberg erroneously discounted
the plain meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and critical aspects of the Act's
legislative history. Further, both courts failed to recognize how arbitration of
employment discrimination claims may achieve the purposes behind the 1991 Act
more efficiently than can be done by the federal judiciary.
Moreover, under the doctrines of traditional contract law, fairness, and
efficiency, pre-dispute arbitration agreements are vital, useful instruments for
resolving suits brought pursuant to Title VII. This article does not suggest that
arbitration should ever supplant agency or court adjudication of statutory claims.
Arbitration should be recognized and encouraged, however, as a fair and adequate
alternative, supplementary mechanism for resolving claims arising under Title VII.
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